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a b s t r a c t 
We present an encryption scheme for authorized equality test on ciphertexts (SEET), which 
allows the data owner to authorize a tester to compare her ciphertexts without decrypting 
their values. The security of SEET is formally proved against three types of adversary, two 
of them for ciphertext conﬁdentiality in the phases before and after authorization respec- 
tively, and the third for token privacy. To the best of our knowledge, our SEET construction 
is the ﬁrst encryption scheme supporting equality test on ciphertexts that is proven secure 
against the three types of adversary in the standard model. Our SEET construction outper- 
forms existing schemes in terms of ciphertext size and encryption/decryption/testing costs. 
To show its application in set operations, we extend it into schemes for controlled set dis- 
tance computation , such that a curious server is able to deduce the similarity/dissimilarity 
score between two encrypted user sets without knowing their elements. 
© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
1. Introduction 
In this paper, we consider controlled set-theoretic operations in data outsourcing scenario. The data owner has many sets 
of sensitive values and wants to engage some server to host them, for example, the data owner may outsource the sets to 
some cloud server. Thereafter, the data owner may authorize the server to perform set operations (e.g., intersection, union, 
and difference) as well as the relations of set equality and set inclusion on these sets without revealing the elements. In this 
scenario, the data owner would have three security concerns: (1) the privacy of the outsourced sets should be preserved 
against the server at all times; (2) the server can perform set operations/relations in a non-interactive way after getting 
authorization from the data owner; and (3) the authorization should be controlled in a way such that only the designated 
server can recover a token for performing set operations/relations. 
To address the above concerns, all set elements and the authorization token should be encrypted before they are sent to 
the server, and the authorized server must be able to perform set operations on the ciphertexts. The encrypted set elements 
and token can only be decrypted by the data owner and server, respectively. It is important for the authorization token to 
be encrypted under the server’s public key to prevent interception, otherwise any person who listens on the communica- 
tion channel could get the token and encrypted sets, and further perform set operations/relations. In fact, the fundamental 
problem in this scenario is the capability for the authorized server to compare the outsourced set elements in ciphertext format . 
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Table 1 
Comparison with existing encryption schemes supporting equality test on ciphertexts. 
Scheme Element size Computation cost Security Model 
Ciphertext Token Enc Dec Test Security-1 Security-2 Security-3 
[14] 1 3 s G + s Z s G + s Z 4 E G 3 E G 2 E G + 2 E ˆ e IND-CCA OW-CCA IND-CCA RO 
[16] 2 (2 λ + 15) s G + s Z 3 s G 14 E G + E ˆ e 11 E G + 9 E ˆ e 10 E G + 6 E ˆ e IND-CCA OW-CCA No Standard 
[17] 3 5 s G + s Z 2 s G 1 6 E G + 2 E ˆ e 2 E G + 2 E ˆ e 4 E ˆ e IND-CCA OW-ID-CCA No RO 
[18] 4 5 s G + s Z 2 s Z 6 E G 5 E G 2 E G + 2 E ˆ e IND-CCA OW-CCA No RO 
[19] s G 1 + 3 s G 2 + s Z 2 s G 1 E G 1 + 3 E G 2 E G 1 + 2 E G 2 4 E a ˆ e IND-CCA OW-CCA IND-CPA RO 
+ E G T + E a ˆ e + E G T + E a ˆ e
[23] 5 7 s G + s G T 2 s Z 7 E G + E ˆ e — 2 E G + 5 E ˆ e IND-CPA OW-CPA No Standard 
[27] 6 4 s G 1 + 3 s Z 2 s G 2 6 E G 1 5 E G 1 2 E a ˆ e IND-CCA OW-CCA IND-CPA RO 
[29] 7 s G + 2 s G 1 + s Z 3 s G 2 2 E G + 2 E G 1 2 E G 4 E a ˆ e IND-CCA OW-CCA IND-CPA RO 
+ |M| +  
[30] 3 s G + s Z 2 s Z 5 E G 2 E G 4 E G IND-CCA OW-CCA No RO 
+ |M| +  
[31] 5 s G + s Z 2 s Z 8 E G + E ˆ e 3 E G + 4 E ˆ e 2 E G + 4 E ˆ e IND-CCA OW-CCA No RO 
[32] 8 3 s G + s Z — 3 E G 3 E G 2 E ˆ e No OW-CCA No RO 
SEET 4 s G 1 4 s G 2 4 E G 1 3 E G 1 2 E a ˆ e IND-CCA OW-CCA IND-CCA Standard 
Notes: 1. Lee et al. [14] enhanced the security of the scheme proposed by Huang et al. [10] . The token is the secret key of the data owner. The 
encryption scheme contained in the Aut procedure only offers IND-CPA security, which is not proved in [14] . The IND-CCA security relies on 
the public key for veriﬁcation. 2. The generic PKEET constructions and instantiation in [16] do not consider the security of token. 3. Security 
against an adversary without holding a token is not proved in [17] . 4. There are four types of authorization in [18] , where the ﬁrst one directly 
gives the secret key of the data owner to the tester as token. 5. Pang and Ding’s [23] scheme does not have a decryption procedure. 6. The 
scheme in [27] only offers IND-CPA security for ciphertexts. Here, an IND-CCA2 secure variant of [27] is compared, which is transformed using 
the technique of [22] in the random oracle model. 7. To generate a token, two data owners should interactively negotiate a common random 
value. 8. Equality test can be performed on ciphertexts without authorization. 
Many studies have been conducted on public key encryption schemes with (authorized) equality test [14,18,19,27,29–32] , 
which allows a sender to encrypt messages under the receiver’s public key, and the receiver can authorize some tester to 
compare the ciphertexts. A rigorous requirement for these schemes is that the message space must be very large, otherwise 
a curious tester may be able to encrypt any message of his choice under the receiver’s public key to compare with the 
received ciphertexts. Privacy of the data is compromised as long as some equivalence relationship is deduced. Clearly, these 
schemes are not applicable to the above problem which requires that only the data owner can encrypt and decrypt values. 
Also, these schemes only offer security in the random oracle model, except the one in [16] . 
In [23] , Pang and Ding designed an encryption scheme that supports ad hoc equijoins on encrypted relations in an out- 
sourced database in a private key setting. With their scheme, data ﬁelds in different relations are encrypted using different 
private parameters. Note that data entries in a relation column are not necessarily unique. With the authorization of the 
data owner in the form of an equijoin token, the server can only detect equivalence across the columns in two designated 
relations, and the server is prevented from testing the equivalence of data entries within a relation if there exists no match- 
ing value in the other relation. Applied to our problem scenario, their scheme only offers IND-CPA security for outsourced 
data in the phase prior to equijoin. Also, privacy of the equijoin token is not considered. 
Outsourced private set intersection (OPSI) [1,12,13] is different from our problem scenario. In OPSI, two parties (say A and 
B) outsource their encoded data sets to a server, and the server is able to compute the intersection of their sets. The OPSI 
schemes presented in [12,13] do not have an authorization mechanism, thus the server is able to deduce the intersection 
immediately upon receiving the data sets. With the OPSI scheme in [1] , when party A wishes to intersect her outsourced 
set with that of party B, she needs to interact with party B to get permission. Party B also needs to inform the server with 
a special message, if he agrees to the intersection request from party A. With that message, the server can generate an 
intermediate result for party A to deduce the ﬁnal intersection. 
1.1. Our contributions 
In this paper, we introduce the notion of secure encryption with authorized equality test (SEET), which allows a data 
owner to authorize a tester to compare her ciphertexts without decrypting their values. We present a SEET construction on 
bilinear groups, for which the security is proved against three types of adversary. Speciﬁcally, before the tester is authorized 
by the data owner, the encrypted data enjoy IND-CCA2 security; after the authorization, SEET offers One-Way CCA2 security 
protection of the data against the tester; the token is encrypted with an IND-CCA2 secure scheme that permits only the 
tester to recover it. To the best of our knowledge, SEET is the ﬁrst encryption scheme with equality test capability that does 
not require random oracles in its security proof. Analysis shows that our SEET construction is more eﬃcient than existing 
related schemes in ciphertext size and computation cost (see Table 1 for a comparison). 
Based on our SEET construction, we present non-interactive, controllable, and privacy-preserving solutions to distance 
computation on three distance functions. In the literature, these data sets may represent user proﬁle features [8] and user 
preferences [2] (see Section 5.1 for a review). The fundamental problem in such controlled computation scenarios is for the 
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server to compare the data owner’s sets in ciphertext format. Our solutions allow the data owner to deposit her encrypted 
datasets on a server, and later issue a token to enable the server to calculate the distance on the outsourced sets, where the 
distance reﬂects the dissimilarity between two sets. The authorization is controlled in a way that only the intended server is 
able to get the token and the authorized server can only perform distance-related computations. We also discuss how these 
solutions for controlled set distance computation can be transformed into symmetric solutions for implicit authentication 
with eﬃcient user proﬁle update, such that both initialization and authentication use the same encryption procedure (SEET) 
to protect the privacy of user proﬁle features. 
1.2. Related works 
Yang et al. [32] presented a public key encryption scheme that supports equality test (PKEET). For any two ciphertexts 
which may be generated under different public keys, anyone is able to check whether they encrypt the same message. Thus, 
their scheme permits no authorization for when a tester may perform equality test on ciphertexts. PKEET schemes with 
delegable/authorized equality test were studied in [10,18,19,27,29,30] , such that only a suitably enabled tester (e.g., a server) 
can perform equality test on the ciphertexts. In particular, the PKEET schemes proposed in [10,18,19,30] allow two users to 
authorize a tester to compare their ciphertexts. With that authorization, the tester can also compare ciphertexts generated 
under the same public key. 
In [30] , Tang proposed an all-or-nothing PKEET (AoN-PKEET) scheme. Slamanig, Spreitzer and Unterluggauer [27] con- 
sidered a special case of AoN-PKEET such that the equality test is only carried out for ciphertexts under the same public 
key, which is called AoN-PKEET ∗. Based on the ElGamal encryption scheme [9,27] proposed an IND-CPA secure AoN-PKEET ∗
scheme in asymmetric bilinear groups. They argued that their scheme can be transformed into an IND-CCA2 secure scheme 
in the random oracle model following the approach in [7,21,22] . Ma [17] presented an encryption scheme that supports out- 
sourced equality test in identity-based setting. Recently, Lee et al. [15] proposed semi-generic constructions for PKEET and 
identity-based encryption scheme with equality test. 
In [16] , a generic PKEET and identity-based PKEET are constructed by employing 2-level hierarchical identity-based en- 
cryption scheme and strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme. They also presented a PKEET instantiation from 
[3] and [4] by following their generic framework. Although their constructions can be proved in the standard model, ef- 
ﬁciency remains a weakness and the security of authorization token is not considered. The basic idea behind controlled 
equijoin scheme for relational databases is also about the capability to perform equality test on ciphertexts, and was ini- 
tially investigated by Pang and Ding [23] in a private key setting on symmetric bilinear groups. 
1.3. Paper organization 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 covers some preliminaries. We introduce SEET and present 
a construction in Section 3 . The security of SEET is proved in Section 4 , where its performance is analyzed and compared 
with existing schemes as well. Privacy-preserving solutions for three controlled set distance computation cases are presented 
in Section 5 based on the SEET scheme. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Preliminaries 
A hash function H : { 0 , 1 } l k × { 0 , 1 } l m → { 0 , 1 } l n is a ε tcr -secure targeted collision-resistant hash function [24,28] if any 
probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) has only negligible advantage in winning the collision ﬁnding 
game, that is 
Adv A ,H = 
⎡ 
⎢ ⎢ ⎣ m  = m ′ ∧ H(m ) = H(m ′ ) 
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(m, state ) 
$ ← A 1 () 
k 
$ ← { 0 , 1 } l k 
m ′ $ ← A 2 (k, state ) 
⎤ 
⎥ ⎥ ⎦ ≤ ε tcr 
where l k , l m , l n denote the length of key, message, and output of H , respectively. 
Suppose G 1 = 〈 g 1 〉 , G 2 = 〈 g 2 〉 and G T are cyclic groups with prime order p and eﬃcient group operations. The mapping 
ˆ e : G 1 × G 2 → G T is bilinear if the following properties are satisﬁed: 
• Bilinearity: ∀ μ ∈ G 1 , ν ∈ G 2 , and ∀ a, b ∈ Z ∗p , ˆ e(μa , νb ) = ˆ e(μ, ν) ab ; 
• Non-degeneracy: ˆ e(g 1 , g 2 )  = 1 ; 
• Eﬃciency: ˆ e is eﬃciently computable. 
If G 1 = G 2 , then ˆ e is a symmetric bilinear map; otherwise, it is asymmetric. In this paper, our schemes are constructed 
using Type 3 (asymmetric) pairing, i.e., there exists no eﬃciently computable isomorphism from G 2 to G 1 . 
The security of our constructions relies on the following complexity assumptions [5,27] . 
Computational Diﬃe–Hellman Assumption (CDH). Let G = 〈 g〉 be a cyclic group with prime order p . The CDH assumption 
states that given a tuple ( g, g x , g y ) ∈ G 3 , where x, y ∈ R Z ∗p , any PPT algorithm has negligible advantage ε cdh in computing g xy . 
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Decisional Diﬃe–Hellman Assumption (DDH). Let G = 〈 g〉 be a cyclic group with prime order p . The DDH assumption states 
that given a tuple ( g, g x , g y , g z ) ∈ G 4 , where x, y, z ∈ R Z ∗p , any PPT algorithm has negligible advantage ε ddh in deciding whether 
g xy = g z . 
Computational co-Diﬃe–Hellman Assumption (co-CDH ∗). Let G 1 = 〈 g 1 〉 , G 2 = 〈 g 2 〉 and G T be three distinct cyclic groups 
with prime order p , and ˆ e : G 1 × G 2 → G T be a Type 3 pairing. The co-CDH ∗ assumption states that given a tuple 
(g x 
1 , g 
y 
1 , g 
x 
2 , g 
y 
2 ) ∈ G 2 1 × G 2 2 , where x, y ∈ R Z ∗p , any PPT algorithm has negligible advantage ε cocdh in computing g 
xy 
1 . 
Symmetric eXternal Diﬃe–Hellman Assumption (SXDH). Let G 1 = 〈 g 1 〉 , G 2 = 〈 g 2 〉 and G T be cyclic groups with prime order 
p and ˆ e : G 1 × G 2 → G T be a Type 3 bilinear pairing. The SXDH assumption states that the DDH assumption holds in both 
groups G 1 and G 2 . 
3. SEET Scheme 
In this section, we introduce SEET and formalize its security model. We then present a SEET construction, and prove its 
security in the standard model in next section. To the best of our knowledge, our SEET construction is the ﬁrst provably 
secure encryption scheme with equality test on ciphertexts against three types of adversary that does not require random 
oracles in the security proof. 
3.1. System framework and requirements 
The SEET system model consists of a data owner and a curious tester. The tester may be a remote storage server. The 
owner has many data sets, denoted by A, B, C , etc., and engages the tester to host them. All entries in data sets are uniformly 
distributed. Subsequently, the owner can authorize the tester to compare her outsourced values. Accordingly, a secure SEET 
scheme should satisfy the following functionalities and requirements. 
• Authorized comparison: Without authorization from the data owner, the tester is unable to compare the outsourced data. 
Also, the authorization token can only be known by the tester, otherwise someone who intercepts the communication 
between the data owner and tester would be able to compare the outsourced data. 
• Non-interactivity: With the authorization, the tester can compare the outsourced data without any interaction with the 
data owner. 
• Privacy: Since the tester may be curious about the outsourced values, all values must be stored in ciphertext, such that 
only the owner can retrieve them for decryption. That means the tester must perform the authorized comparison on the 
encrypted elements without knowing their real values. Even with the authorization to perform comparison, the tester 
should still be unable to infer the real values of outsourced data. Also, the authorization token cannot leak the secret 
key of data owner. 
3.2. Deﬁnitions 
A SEET scheme consists of the following eight procedures: 
• Setup (λ) → pp : Given security parameter λ, the system setup procedure produces public parameter pp . 
• KGen O (pp ) → sk O : With public parameter pp , the data owner executes the key generation procedure to produce a secret 
key sk O . 
• KGen T (pp ) → ( sk T , pk T ) : With public parameter pp , the tester executes the key generation procedure to produce a pair 
of secret key sk T and public key pk T . 
• Enc ( sk O , pp , m ) → C: With secret key sk O and public parameter pp , the data owner runs the encryption procedure on 
message m to produce a ciphertext C . 
• Dec ( sk O , pp , C) → m/ ⊥ : With secret key sk O and public parameter pp , the data owner runs the decryption procedure on 
ciphertext C to produce a message m or ⊥ that signiﬁes an error in decryption. 
• Aut ( sk O , pp , pk T ) → etk : Using secret key sk O , public parameter pp and the tester’s public key pk T , the data owner runs 
the authorization procedure to produce an encrypted token etk . 
• Rec ( sk T , pp , etk ) → tk / ⊥ : With secret key sk T and public parameter pp , the tester runs the token recovery procedure on 
etk to produce a token tk or ⊥ that signiﬁes an error in recovery. 
• Com ( pp , tk , C 1 , C 2 ) → 1 / 0 : With public parameter pp and token tk , the tester runs the comparison procedure on two 
ciphertexts C 1 and C 2 . The procedure outputs 1 if C 1 and C 2 encrypt the same plaintext; otherwise, the procedure outputs 
0. 
A SEET scheme must be sound in the sense that: (1) Every ciphertext generated by Enc is decryptable by Dec ; (2) The 
token generated by Aut is recoverable by Rec ; (3) For any two ciphertexts that encrypt the same message, the procedure 
Com must output 1; (4) For any two ciphertexts that encrypt different messages, the procedure Com must output 0. 
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Soundness) . A SEET scheme is sound if, for any security parameter λ ∈ N , any public parameter pp ← 
Setup (λ) , any secret key of data owner sk O ← KGen O (pp ) , and any secret/public key pair of tester ( sk T , pk T ) ← KGen T (pp ) , 
the following conditions are satisﬁed: 
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Fig. 1. IND-CCA security game for ciphertexts against Type-1 adversary. 
1. For every m ∈ M , Dec ( sk O , pp , Enc ( sk O , pp , m )) = m . 
2. Rec ( sk T , pp , Aut ( sk O , pp , pk T )) = tk . 
3. For any m 1 = m 2 ∈ M such that C 1 ← Enc ( sk O , pp , m 1 ) and C 2 ← Enc ( sk O , pp , m 2 ) , Com ( pp , tk , C 1 , C 2 ) = 1 where tk ← 
Rec ( sk T , pp , Aut ( sk O , pp , pk T )) . 
4. For any m 1  = m 2 ∈ M such that C 1 ← Enc ( sk O , pp , m 1 ) and C 2 ← Enc ( sk O , pp , m 2 ) , Com ( pp , tk , C 1 , C 2 ) = 0 where tk ← 
Rec ( sk T , pp , Aut ( sk O , pp , pk T )) . 
In a SEET scheme, the user can authorize the tester to perform equality test on her ciphertexts. In relation to the conﬁ- 
dentiality of ciphertexts and token produced by a SEET scheme, three types of adversary need to be considered: 
• Type-1 adversary : It models a curious tester who has not been authorized by the user, that is, the tester only has the 
public parameter pp . 
• Type-2 adversary : It models a curious tester who has been authorized by the user, that is, the tester has both the public 
parameter pp , the tester’s secret and public keys, and an encrypted token etk . 
• Type-3 adversary : It models a curious adversary who has both the public parameter pp and the tester’s public key pk T , 
and intends to recover the token tk from encrypted token etk . 
The ﬁrst two types of adversaries respectively capture the notion of ciphertext conﬁdentiality before and after the autho- 
rization procedure is executed, while the third captures the notion of token conﬁdentiality. We formally deﬁne the security 
of a SEET scheme in the following three deﬁnitions. 
Deﬁnition 3.2 (IND-CCA security against Type-1 adversary) . Let  = ( Setup , KGen O , KGen T , Enc , Dec , Aut , Rec , Com ) be a 
SEET scheme. Suppose A is a PPT adversary who interacts with a challenger C to perform the security game in Fig. 1 . Let 
Adv ind −cca , A = 
∣∣∣Pr [ b ′ = b] − 1 
2 
∣∣∣
 is said to offer indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) for ciphertexts against Type-1 ad- 
versary if, for all PPT adversary A , there exists a negligible function ε( · ) such that Adv ind −cca 
, A ≤ ε(·) . 
Deﬁnition 3.3 (OW-CCA security against Type-2 adversary) . Let  = ( Setup , KGen O , KGen T , Enc , Dec , Aut , Rec , Com ) be a 
SEET scheme. Suppose A is a PPT adversary who interacts with a challenger C to perform the security game in Fig. 2 . Let 
Adv ow−cca , A = Pr [ m ′ = m ∗] 
 is said to offer one-way conﬁdentiality under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (OW-CCA) for ciphertexts against Type-2 
adversary if, for all PPT adversary A , there exists a negligible function ε( · ) such that Adv ow−cca 
, A ≤ ε(·) . 
Note that every data owner only needs to generate one token for the tester to compare her ciphertexts. Thus, the fol- 
lowing security game is deﬁned in a multi-data-owner setting. 
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Fig. 2. OW-CCA security game for ciphertexts against Type-2 adversary. 
Fig. 3. IND-CCA security game for tokens against Type-3 adversary. 
Deﬁnition 3.4 (IND-CCA security against Type-3 adversary) . Let  = ( Setup , KGen O , KGen T , Enc , Dec , Aut , Rec , Com ) be a 
SEET scheme. Suppose A is a PPT adversary who interacts with a challenger C to perform the security game in Fig. 3 . Let 
Adv ind −cca A , token = 
∣∣∣Pr [ b ′ = b] − 1 
2 
∣∣∣
 is said to offer indistinguishability under adaptive chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) for tokens against Type-3 adversary 
if, for all PPT adversary A , there exists a negligible function ε( · ) such that Adv ind −cca A , token ≤ ε(·) . 
3.3. Construction 
In this section, we present a SEET construction using Type 3 bilinear pairing. 
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Setup : Choose a bilinear map ˆ e : G 1 × G 2 → G T , where G 1 = 〈 g 1 〉 , G 2 = 〈 g 2 〉 , G T are cyclic groups with prime order p , and 
the SXDH assumption holds. Let H 1 : G 1 → Z p , H 2 : G 3 1 → Z p , H 3 : G 2 → Z p and H 4 : G 3 2 → Z p be four target collision-resistant 
hash functions. The public parameter is pp = ( ˆ  e, G 1 , G 2 , G T , g 1 , g 2 , p, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 ) . 
KGen O : Pick random values x, y, u, v 
$ ← Z ∗p . The data owner’s secret key is sk O = (x, y, u, v ) . 
KGen T : Pick random values ˜ x, ˜  y, ˜  u, ˜  v
$ ← Z ∗p and compute 
h¯ 1 = g ˜ x2 , h¯ 2 = g ˜ y2 , h¯ 3 = g ˜ u2 , h¯ 4 = g ˜ v2 . 
The tester’s secret key and public key are sk T = ( ˜  x, ˜  y, ˜  u, ˜  v) and pk T = ( ¯h 1 , ¯h 2 , ¯h 3 , ¯h 4 ) , respectively. 
Enc : Given a message m ∈ G 1 , choose a random value α $ ← Z ∗p and compute the ciphertext C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) as follows: 
c 1 = g α1 , c 2 = mg αx 1 , c 3 = (g xθ+ y 1 ) α, c 4 = (g uϑ+ v 1 ) α
where θ = H 1 (c 1 ) and ϑ = H 2 (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) . 
Dec : Given a ciphertext C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) , compute 
θ = H 1 (c 1 ) and ϑ = H 2 (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) , 
and check 
c 3 
? = c xθ+ y 
1 and c 4 
? = c uϑ+ v 1 . 
If both conditions hold, then output m = c 2 /c x 1 ; otherwise, output ⊥ . 
Aut : With sk O and pk T , choose a random value γ
$ ← Z ∗p and compute an encrypted token etk = (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 ) as follows: 
t 1 = g γ2 , t 2 = g xγ2 h¯ γ1 , t 3 = ( ¯h 
˜ θ
1 ¯h 2 ) 
γ , t 4 = ( ¯h ˜ ϑ 3 h¯ 4 ) γ
where ˜ θ = H 3 (t 1 ) and ˜ ϑ = H 4 (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 ) . 
Rec : Given an encrypted token etk = (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 ) , compute 
˜ θ = H 3 (t 1 ) and ˜ ϑ = H 4 (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 ) , 
and check 
t 3 
? = t ˜ x ˜ θ+ ˜ y
1 and t 4 
? = t ˜ u ˜ ϑ + ˜ v1 . 
If both conditions hold, then output tk = ( ˆ t1 , ˆ  t2 ) = (t 1 , t 2 /t ˜ x1 ) ; otherwise, output ⊥ . 
Com : Given two ciphertexts C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) and C ′ = (c ′ 1 , c ′ 2 , c ′ 3 , c ′ 4 ) and a token tk , check whether 
ˆ e
(
c 2 
c ′ 
2 
, ˆ  t1 
)
? = ˆ e
(
c 1 
c ′ 
1 
, ˆ  t2 
)
(1) 
Output “1” if the condition holds, which implies m = m ′ ; otherwise output “0” which signiﬁes that m  = m ′ . 
Theorem 3.1. The SEET scheme proposed above is sound. 
Proof. The correctness of ciphertext decryption and token recovery are straightforward. For ciphertext comparison, we 
have 
ˆ e
(
c 2 
c ′ 
2 
, ˆ  t1 
)
= ˆ e
(
mg αx 1 
m ′ g α′ x 
1 
, g 
γ
2 
)
= ˆ e
(
m 
m ′ · g 
(α−α′ ) x 
1 , g 
γ
2 
)
m = m ′ ⇐⇒ ˆ e(g α−α′ 1 , g xγ2 ) = ˆ e
(
c 1 
c ′ 
1 
, ˆ  t2 
)
Thus, Equality (1) holds if and only if m = m ′ . 
4. Analysis 
4.1. Security 
To prove the security of our proposed SEET construction in the previous section, we need the following lemma [6] . 
Lemma 4.1. Let E 1 , E 2 , and F be events deﬁned on some probability space. Suppose the event E 1 ∧ ¬ F occurs if and only if 
E 2 ∧ ¬ F occurs. Then | Pr [ E 1 ] − Pr [ E 2 ] | ≤ Pr [ F ] . 
Theorem 4.1. Suppose H 1 and H 2 are secure target collision-resistant hash functions. Prior to authorization, the SEET scheme in 
Section 3.3 offers IND-CCA security for ciphertexts in the standard model assuming that the SXDH assumption holds. 
Proof. The following proof follows the standard framework established in [28] . 
Let ε sxdh be the advantage of a PPT adversary in deciding the DDH problem on G 1 . Let ε1 and ε2 be the advantages of a 
PPT adversary in ﬁnding collisions in H 1 and H 2 , respectively. 
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Let A be a PPT adversary that has non-negligible advantage ε in attacking the IND-CCA2 security for ciphertexts in 
the SEET scheme. Prior to the authorization phase, the adversary does not have the token tk . Suppose A issues at most 
q E encryption queries and q D decryption queries. We show that if such an adversary A exists, then one can construct an 
algorithm E to solve the SXDH problem with non-negligible probability. 
Let G 1 = 〈 g〉 , G 2 , G T be cycle groups with prime order p and bilinear map ˆ e : G 1 × G 2 → G T . Also, let H 1 and H 2 be two 
target collision resistant hash functions. At ﬁrst, algorithm E is given a SXDH instance (g 1 , g α∗1 , g x 1 , g z 1 ) ∈ (G 1 ) 4 . The goal of E
is to determine whether g α
∗x 
1 = g z 1 . Algorithm E simulates the challenger and interacts with adversary A as follows. 
Set-up : Algorithm E sets c ∗
1 = g α
∗
1 , computes θ
∗ = H 1 (c ∗1 ) , and randomly picks u, v , w 
$ ← Z ∗p . The data owner’s secret key 
sk O is (x, w − xθ ∗, u, v ) , where x and y = w − xθ ∗ are unknown to E . 
Phase 1 : The adversary adaptively makes the following queries. 
• Encryption query: For input message m , algorithm E randomly picks α $ ← Z ∗p , and computes ciphertext C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) 
as follows: 
c 1 = g α1 , θ = H 1 (c 1 ) , c 2 = m (g x 1 ) α, c 3 = (g x 1 ) α(θ−θ
∗) g αw 1 , ϑ = H 2 (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) , c 4 = g α(uϑ+ v ) 1 
Note that c 3 = (g xθ+(w −xθ
∗) 
1 ) 
α = (g xθ+ y 
1 ) 
α . E returns C as the ciphertext for m . Here if c 1 = g α∗1 or c 1 = g x 1 , then algorithm 
E stops the simulation. 
• Decryption query: For input ciphertext C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) , algorithm E ﬁrst checks c 1 ? = c ∗1 . If so, algorithm E aborts; oth- 
erwise, E computes 
θ = H 1 (c 1 ) and ϑ = H 2 (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) 
and checks 
c 4 
? = c uϑ+ v 1 
If the condition does not hold or θ = θ ∗, then algorithm E outputs ⊥ ; otherwise, E computes 
m = c 2 / (c 3 c −w 1 ) (θ−θ
∗) −1 
where c 3 = (g xθ1 g 
y 
1 ) 
α and c w 
1 = (g w 1 ) α = (g xθ
∗
1 g 
y 
1 ) 
α . Then, E returns the message m . 
Challenge : Adversary A picks two random messages m 0 and m 1 of the same length, and gives them to E . Then, algorithm 
E randomly picks b $ ← { 0 , 1 } , and generates the challenge ciphertext C ∗ = (c ∗
1 , c 
∗
2 , c 
∗
3 , c 
∗
4 ) as follows: 
c ∗1 = g α
∗
1 , θ
∗ = H 1 (c ∗1 ) , c ∗2 = m b g z 1 , c ∗3 = (g α
∗
1 ) 
w , ϑ ∗ = H 2 (c ∗1 , c ∗2 , c ∗3 ) , c ∗4 = (g α
∗
1 ) 
uϑ ∗+ v 
Note that c 3 = (g xθ
∗+ y 
1 ) 
α∗ . Then, algorithm E returns the challenge ciphertext C ∗. 
Phase 2 : The adversary can continue to make queries except that C ∗ cannot be submitted for decryption. 
Guess : If algorithm E does not abort in the two query phases, then the simulation is perfect for CCA2 attack and the 
adversary’s view is the same as that in a real attack. Eventually, adversary A returns a guess b ′ . Algorithm E outputs “1” if 
b ′ = b; otherwise, E outputs “0”. 
Analysis . We analyze the success probability of algorithm E through a sequence of games [26,28] . The ﬁrst game G 0 is 
the same as above but has no abortion during queries; while the last one G 6 gives no advantage to adversary A . Let i 
denote the event that b ′ = b in game G i for 0 ≤ i ≤ 6. Thus, Adv ind −cca , A = | Pr [0 ] − 1 2 | = ε. 
Game G 1 : (Eliminate the correct guess of α∗ and x ). Game G 1 is similar to game G 0 except that α∗ and x would not be 
chosen in answering encryption queries. Note that if either α∗ or x is chosen, then the given DDH problem on G 1 is already 
solved by algorithm E . Denote this abortion case by event E 1 . According to Lemma 4.1 , we have | Pr [1 ] − Pr [0 ] | ≤ Pr [ E 1 ] . 
Lemma 4.2. Pr [ E 1 ] ≤ 2 q E p . 
The proof of Lemma 4.2 is straightforward due to 
Pr [ E 1 ] = 2 
p 
+ 
(
1 − 2 
p 
)
2 
p 
+ · · · + 
(
1 − 2 
p 
)q E −1 2 
p 
≤ 2 q E 
p 
Game G 2 : (Eliminate the correct guess of c 1 ). Game G 2 is similar to game G 1 except that a decryption query for cipher- 
text C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) is rejected and algorithm E aborts, if c 1 = c ∗1 . Denote this rejection case by event E 2 . According to 
Lemma 4.1 , we have | Pr [2 ] − Pr [1 ] | ≤ Pr [ E 2 ] . 
Lemma 4.3. Pr [ E 2 ] ≤ q D p . 
The proof of Lemma 4.3 is straightforward due to 
Pr [ E 2 ] = 1 
p 
+ 
(
1 − 1 
p 
)
1 
p 
+ · · · + 
(
1 − 1 
p 
)q D −1 1 
p 
≤ q D 
p 
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Game G 3 : (Eliminate the target collision of H 1 ). Game G 3 is similar to game G 2 except that a decryption query for a valid 
ciphertext C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) is rejected and algorithm E aborts, if c 1  = c ∗1 and θ = θ ∗ where θ = H 1 (c 1 ) . According to the 
deﬁnition of target collision resistant hash function, the probability of this rejection case is at most some negligible value 
ε1 . Therefore, according to Lemma 4.1 , we have | Pr [3 ] − Pr [2 ] | ≤ ε 1 . 
Game G 4 : (Eliminate the target collision of H 2 ). Game G 4 is similar to game G 3 except that a decryption query for a valid 
ciphertext C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) is rejected and algorithm E aborts, if c 2  = c ∗2 and ϑ = ϑ ∗ where ϑ = H 2 (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) . According 
to the deﬁnition of target collision resistant hash function, the probability of this rejection case is at most some negligible 
value ε2 . Therefore, according to Lemma 4.1 , we have | Pr [4 ] − Pr [3 ] | ≤ ε 2 . 
Game G 5 : (Eliminate invalid ciphertext). Game G 5 is similar to game G 4 except that all decryption queries for invalid 
ciphertexts C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) are rejected. The validity of C can be checked by 
c 4 
? = c uϑ+ v 1 
where ϑ = H 2 (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) . With a valid ciphertext C , the adversary may try to generate C ′ = (c 1 , c 2 m ′ , c 3 , c ′ 4 ) , where m ′ , c ′ 4 
$ ← 
G 1 . The probability of C 
′ not being rejected in decrypting the query is 1/ p . Therefore, according to Lemma 4.1 , we have 
| Pr [5 ] − Pr [4 ] | ≤ q D p . 
Game G 6 : (Modify the challenge ciphertext). In this game, the element c ∗2 is replaced by a random value c ′ 2 ∈ G 1 such 
that C ∗ is a valid challenge ciphertext. If adversary A cannot distinguish g α∗x 
1 from a random value in G 1 , then game G 6 is 
equivalent to game G 5 . Thus, we have | Pr [6 ] − Pr [5 ] | ≤ ε sxdh . Also, since c ′ 2 is independent of b , it gives no information 
about b to adversary A . Therefore, Pr [6 ] = 1 2 . 
Combining the above results for games G i , we have 
ε ≤ ε sxdh + ε 1 + ε 2 + 2 q E 
p 
+ 2 q D 
p 
This concludes Theorem 4.1 . 
Theorem 4.2. Suppose H 1 and H 2 are secure target collision-resistant hash functions. After authorization, the SEET scheme in 
Section 3.3 offers OW-CCA security for ciphertexts in the standard model assuming that the co-CDH ∗ assumption and SXDH as- 
sumption hold. 
Proof. The following proof follows the standard frameworks established in [27,28,32] . 
Let ε sxdh be the advantage of a PPT adversary in deciding the SXDH problem, and ε cocdh be the advantage if a PPT 
adversary in solving the co-CDH ∗ problem. Let ε1 and ε2 be the advantages of a PPT adversary in ﬁnding collisions in H 1 
and H 2 , respectively. 
Let A be a PPT adversary that has non-negligible advantage ε in attacking the OW-CCA security of the SEET scheme. 
Note that in this phase, the adversary should hold the token tk . Suppose A issues at most q E encryption queries and q D 
decryption queries. We show that if such an adversary A exists, then one can construct an algorithm E to solve the co-CDH ∗
problem with non-negligible probability. 
Let G 1 = 〈 g〉 , G 2 , G T be cycle groups with prime order p and bilinear map ˆ e : G 1 × G 2 → G T . Let H 1 and H 2 be two target 
collision resistant hash functions. At ﬁrst, algorithm E is given a co-CDH ∗ instance (g α∗
1 , g 
x 
1 , g 
α∗
2 , g 
x 
2 ) ∈ G 2 1 × G 2 2 . The goal of E
is to compute g α
∗x 
1 . Algorithm E simulates the challenger and interacts with adversary A as follows. 
Set-up : Algorithm E sets c ∗1 = g α
∗
1 , computes θ
∗ = H 1 (c ∗1 ) , and randomly picks u, v , w 
$ ← Z ∗p . The data owner’s secret key 
sk O is (x, w − xθ ∗, u, v ) , where x and y = w − xθ ∗ are unknown to E . Algorithm E randomly chooses z $ ← Z ∗p , sets the token 
as tk ← (g z 
2 , (g 
x 
2 ) 
z ) , and gives tk to adversary A . 
Phase 1 : The adversary adaptively makes the following queries. 
• Encryption query: For input message m , algorithm E randomly picks α $ ← Z ∗p , and computes the ciphertext C = 
(c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) as follows: 
c 1 = g α1 , θ = H 1 (c 1 ) , c 2 = m · (g x 1 ) α, c 3 = (g x 1 ) α(θ−θ
∗) g αw 1 , ϑ = H 2 (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) , c 4 = g α(uϑ+ v ) 1 
Note that c 3 = (g xθ+(w −xθ
∗) 
1 ) 
α = (g xθ+ y 
1 ) 
α . E returns C as the ciphertext of m . Here if c 1 = g α∗1 or c 1 = g x 1 , then algorithm 
E stops the simulation. 
• Decryption query: For input ciphertext C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) , algorithm E ﬁrst checks c 1 ? = c ∗1 . If so, algorithm E aborts; oth- 
erwise, E computes 
θ = H 1 (c 1 ) and ϑ = H 2 (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) 
and checks 
c 4 
? = c uϑ+ v 1 
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If the condition does not hold or θ = θ ∗, then algorithm E outputs ⊥ ; otherwise, E computes 
m = c 2 / (c 3 c −w 1 ) (θ−θ
∗) −1 
where c 3 = (g xθ1 g 
y 
1 ) 
α and c w 
1 = (g w 1 ) α = (g xθ
∗
1 g 
y 
1 ) 
α . Then, E returns the message m . 
Challenge : Algorithm E randomly picks c ∗
2 
$ ← G 1 , and generates the challenge ciphertext C ∗ = (c ∗1 , c ∗2 , c ∗3 , c ∗4 ) as follows: 
c ∗1 = g α
∗
1 , θ
∗ = H 1 (c ∗1 ) , c ∗3 = (g α
∗
1 ) 
w , ϑ ∗ = H 2 (c ∗1 , c ∗2 , c ∗3 ) , c ∗4 = (g α
∗
1 ) 
uϑ ∗+ v 
Note that c 3 = (g xθ
∗+ y 
1 ) 
α∗ . Then, algorithm E gives the challenge ciphertext C ∗ to A . 
Phase 2 : The adversary can continue to make queries except that C ∗ cannot be submitted for decryption. 
Guess : If algorithm E does not abort in the two query phases, then the simulation is perfect for OW-CCA2 attack and 
the adversary’s view is the same as that in a real attack. Eventually, if adversary A outputs m ′ , then algorithm E outputs 
g α
∗x 
1 = c ∗2 /m ′ as the solution to the co-CDH ∗ instance. 
Analysis . We analyze the success probability of algorithm E through a sequence of games [26,28] . The ﬁrst game G 0 
is the same as above but has no abortion during queries and m ′ is not involved in any queries; the subsequent games 
gradually consider abortion cases. Let i denote the event that m 
′ is a correct output in game G i for 0 ≤ i ≤ 6. Thus, 
Adv ow−cca 
, A = ε = Pr [0 ] = ε cocdh . 
Game G 1 : (Eliminate the correct guess of α∗ and x ). Game G 1 is similar to game G 0 except that α∗ and x would not be 
chosen in answering encryption queries. Note that if either α∗ or x is chosen, then the given co-CDH ∗ problem is already 
solved by algorithm E . Denote this abortion case by event E 1 . According to Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2 , we have | Pr [1 ] − Pr [0 ] | ≤
Pr [ E 1 ] and Pr [ E 1 ] ≤ 2 q E p . 
Game G 2 : (Eliminate the correct guess of c 1 ). Game G 2 is similar to game G 1 except that a decryption query for cipher- 
text C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) is rejected and algorithm E aborts, if c 1 = c ∗1 . Denote this rejection case by event E 2 . According to 
Lemmas 4.1 and 4.3 , we have | Pr [2 ] − Pr [1 ] | ≤ Pr [ E 2 ] and Pr [ E 2 ] ≤ q D p . 
Game G 3 : (Eliminate the correct guess of m ′ ). If m ′ is involved in any encryption and decryption query, then the adversary 
is able to compare its ciphertext with the challenge ciphertext, which leaks the challenge message to the adversary. Thus, 
game G 3 is similar to game G 2 except that algorithm E aborts if m ′ is involved in any query. Denote this rejection case by 
event E 3 . According to Lemma 4.1 , we have | Pr [3 ] − Pr [2 ] | ≤ Pr [ E 3 ] , where Pr [ E 3 ] ≤ q E + q D p . 
Game G 4 : (Eliminate the target collision of H 1 ). Game G 4 is similar to game G 3 except that a decryption query for a valid 
ciphertext C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) is rejected and algorithm E aborts, if c 1  = c ∗1 and θ = θ ∗ where θ = H 1 (c 1 ) . According to the 
deﬁnition of target collision resistant hash function, the probability of this rejection case is at most some negligible value 
ε1 . Therefore, according to Lemma 4.1 , we have | Pr [4 ] − Pr [3 ] | ≤ ε 1 . 
Game G 5 : (Eliminate the target collision of H 2 ). Game G 5 is similar to game G 4 except that a decryption query for a valid 
ciphertext C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) is rejected and algorithm E aborts, if c 2  = c ∗2 and ϑ = ϑ ∗ where ϑ = H 2 (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) . According 
to the deﬁnition of target collision resistant hash function, the probability of this rejection case is at most some negligible 
value ε2 . Therefore, according to Lemma 4.1 , we have | Pr [5 ] − Pr [4 ] | ≤ ε 2 . 
Game G 6 : (Eliminate invalid ciphertext). Game G 6 is similar to game G 5 except that all decryption queries for invalid 
ciphertexts C = (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 ) are rejected. The validity of C can be checked by c 4 ? = c uϑ+ v 1 where ϑ = H 2 (c 1 , c 2 , c 3 ) . With 
a valid ciphertext C , the adversary may try to generate C ′ = (c 1 , c 2 m ′ , c 3 , c ′ 4 ) , where m ′ , c ′ 4 
$ ← G 1 . The probability of C ′ not 
being rejected in decrypting the query is 1/ p . Therefore, according to Lemma 4.1 , we have | Pr [6 ] − Pr [5 ] | ≤ q D p . 
Combining the above results for games G i , we have 
ε ≤ ε cocdh + ε 1 + ε 2 + 3 q E 
p 
+ 3 q D 
p 
This concludes Theorem 4.2 . 
Theorem 4.3. Suppose H 3 and H 4 are secure target collision-resistant hash functions. The SEET scheme in Section 3.3 offers 
IND-CCA security for tokens in the standard model assuming that the SXDH assumption holds. 
In the Aut procedure, g x 
2 is in fact randomized by γ and encrypted by the following procedure: 
t 1 = g γ2 , t 2 = m ¯h γ1 , t 3 = ( ¯h 
˜ θ
1 ¯h 2 ) 
γ , t 4 = ( ¯h ˜ ϑ 3 h¯ 4 ) γ
Thus, proving Theorem 4.3 is equivalent to showing that the above public key encryption procedure is IND-CCA2 secure. 
Proof. The following proof follows the standard framework established in [28] . 
Let ε sxdh be the advantage of a PPT adversary in deciding the DDH problem on G 2 . Let ε3 and ε4 be the advantages of a 
PPT adversary in ﬁnding collisions in H 3 and H 4 , respectively. 
Let A be a PPT adversary that has non-negligible advantage ε in attacking the IND-CCA2 security of the above scheme. 
Suppose A issues at most q D decryption queries. We show that if such an adversary A exists, then one can construct an 
algorithm E to solve the SXDH problem with non-negligible probability. 
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Let G 1 = 〈 g〉 , G 2 , G T be cyclic groups with prime order p and bilinear map ˆ e : G 1 × G 2 → G T . Also, let H 3 and H 4 be two 
target collision resistant hash functions. At ﬁrst, algorithm E is given a SXDH instance (g 2 , g γ
∗
2 , g ˜
 x
2 , g ˜
 z
2 ) ∈ (G 2 ) 4 . The goal of E
is to determine whether g 
γ ∗ ˜ x
2 = g ˜ z2 . Algorithm E simulates the challenger and interacts with adversary A as follows. 
Set-up : Algorithm E sets h¯ 1 = g ˜ x2 and t ∗1 = g 
γ ∗
2 , randomly picks ˜ u, ˜  v, ˜ w
$ ← Z ∗p and computes 
˜ θ ∗ = H 3 (t ∗1 ) , ¯h 2 = h¯ −
˜ θ ∗
1 g 
˜ w
2 , ¯h 3 = g ˜ u2 , ¯h 4 = g ˜ v2 
Algorithm E gives the public key pk T = ( ¯h 1 , ¯h 2 , ¯h 3 , ¯h 4 ) to the adversary. Note that the secret key sk T is ( ˜  x, ˜ w− ˜ x ˜ θ ∗, ˜  u, ˜  v) , 
where ˜ x and ˜ y = ˜ w− ˜ x ˜ θ ∗ are unknown to E . 
Phase 1 : The adversary adaptively makes decryption queries. For input ciphertext C = (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 ) , algorithm E ﬁrst 
checks whether t 1 
? = t ∗
1 . If so, algorithm E aborts; otherwise, E computes 
˜ θ = H 3 (t 1 ) and ˜ ϑ = H 4 (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 ) 
and checks whether 
t 4 
? = t ˜ u ˜ ϑ + ˜ v1 
If it does not hold or ˜ θ = ˜ θ ∗, then algorithm E outputs ⊥ ; otherwise, E computes 
m = t 2 / (t 3 t − ˜ w1 ) ( ˜
 θ− ˜ θ ∗) −1 
where t 3 = (g ˜ x ˜ θ2 g 
˜ y
2 ) 
γ and t ˜  w
1 = (g ˜ w2 ) γ = (g ˜ x
˜ θ∗
2 g 
˜ y
2 ) 
γ . Then, E returns the message m . 
Challenge : Adversary A picks two random messages m 0 and m 1 , and gives them to E . Then, algorithm E randomly picks 
b 
$ ← { 0 , 1 } , and generates the challenge ciphertext C ∗ = (t ∗
1 , t 
∗
2 , t 
∗
3 , t 
∗
4 ) as follows: 
t ∗1 = g γ
∗
2 , θ
∗ = H 3 (t ∗1 ) , t ∗2 = m b g ˜ z2 , t ∗3 = (g γ
∗
2 ) 
˜ w, ϑ ∗ = H 4 (t ∗1 , t ∗2 , t ∗3 ) , t ∗4 = (g γ
∗
2 ) 
˜ u ˜ ϑ ∗+ ˜ v
Note that t 3 = (g ˜ x
˜ θ∗+ ˜ y
2 ) 
γ ∗ . Then, algorithm E returns the challenge ciphertext C ∗. 
Phase 2 : The adversary can continue to make queries except that C ∗ cannot be submitted for decryption. 
Guess : If algorithm E does not abort in the two query phases, then the simulation is perfect for CCA2 attack and the 
adversary’s view is the same as that in a real attack. Eventually, adversary A returns a guess b ′ . Algorithm E outputs “1” if 
b ′ = b; otherwise, E outputs “0”. 
Analysis . We analyze the success probability of algorithm E through a sequence of games [26,28] . The ﬁrst game G 0 is 
the same as the above but has no abortion during queries; while the last one G 6 gives no advantage to adversary A . Let i 
denote the event that b ′ = b in game G i for 0 ≤ i ≤ 6. Thus, Adv ind −cca A , token = | Pr [0 ] − 1 2 | = ε. 
Game G 1 : (Eliminate the correct guess of t 1 ). Game G 1 is similar to game G 0 except that a decryption query for cipher- 
text C = (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 ) is rejected and algorithm E aborts, if t 1 = t ∗1 . Denote this rejection case by event E 1 . According to 
Lemma 4.1 , we have | Pr [1 ] − Pr [0 ] | ≤ Pr [ E 1 ] . 
Lemma 4.4. Pr [ E 1 ] ≤ q D p . 
The proof for Lemma 4.4 is the same as that for Lemma 4.3 and is omitted. 
Game G 2 : (Eliminate the target collision of H 3 ). Game G 2 is similar to game G 1 except that a decryption query for a 
valid ciphertext C = (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 ) is rejected and algorithm E aborts, if t 1  = t ∗1 and ˜ θ = ˜ θ ∗ where ˜ θ = H 3 (t 1 ) . According to the 
deﬁnition of target collision resistant hash function, the probability of this rejection case is at most some negligible value 
ε3 . Therefore, by Lemma 4.1 , we have | Pr [2 ] − Pr [1 ] | ≤ ε 3 . 
Game G 3 : (Eliminate the target collision of H 4 ). Game G 3 is similar to game G 2 except that a decryption query for a valid 
ciphertext C = (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 ) is rejected and algorithm E aborts, if t 2  = t ∗2 and ˜ ϑ = ˜ ϑ ∗ where ˜ ϑ = H 4 (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 ) . According to 
the deﬁnition of target collision resistant hash function, the probability of this rejection case is at most some negligible 
value ε4 . Therefore, by Lemma 4.1 , we have | Pr [3 ] − Pr [2 ] | ≤ ε 4 . 
Game G 4 : (Eliminate invalid ciphertext). Game G 4 is similar to game G 3 except that all decryption queries for invalid 
ciphertexts C = (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 , t 4 ) are rejected. The validity of C can be checked by 
t 4 
? = t ˜ u ˜ ϑ + ˜ v1 
where ˜ ϑ = H 4 (t 1 , t 2 , t 3 ) . With a valid ciphertext C , the adversary may try to generate C ′ = (t 1 , t 2 m ′ , t 3 , t ′ 4 ) where m ′ , t ′ 4 
$ ← G 2 . 
The probability of C ′ not being rejected in decrypting the query is 1/ p . Therefore, by Lemma 4.1 , we have | Pr [4 ] − Pr [3 ] | ≤
q D 
p . 
Game G 5 : (Modify the challenge ciphertext). In this game, element t ∗2 is replaced by a random value t ′ 2 ∈ G 2 such that C ∗
is a valid challenge ciphertext. If adversary A cannot distinguish g γ ∗ ˜ x
2 from a random value in G 2 , then game G 5 is equivalent 
to game G 4 . Thus, we have | Pr [5 ] − Pr [4 ] | ≤ ε sxdh . Also, since t ′ 2 is independent of b , it gives no information about b to 
adversary A . Therefore, Pr [5 ] = 1 2 . 
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Combining the above results for games G i , we have 
ε ≤ ε sxdh + ε 3 + ε 4 + 2 q D 
p 
This concludes Theorem 4.3 . 

4.2. Comparison 
We analyze our SEET scheme and compare it with existing encryption schemes supporting equality test on ciphertexts. 
The comparison is summarized in Table 1 in terms of ciphertext size, computation costs, ciphertext/token security, etc., 
where security-1/-2 denotes ciphertext security in the phases before/after authorization, and security-3 denote the security 
of token against Type-3 adversary. 
In the table, s G denotes the element size in G for a symmetric bilinear map ˆ e : G × G → G T ; also, E G and E ˆ e represent 
the evaluation costs of an exponentiation in G and a bilinear map ˆ e(·, ·) for this symmetric ˆ e, respectively. Similarly, s G 1 
and s G 2 respective denote the element sizes in G 1 and G 2 for an asymmetric bilinear map ˆ e : G 1 × G 2 → G T ; while E G 1 , E G 2 
and E a ˆ e represent the evaluation costs of an exponentiation in G 1 and G 2 and a bilinear map ˆ e(·, ·) for the asymmetric ˆ e, 
respectively. We use s Z and s G T to denote the element sizes of Z p and G T , respectively, for both types of bilinear maps. 
We also use E G T to denote the cost of an exponentiation on G T . Moreover, s G , |M| and  respectively denote the size of 
an ordinary multiplicative cyclic group G , message space M and security parameter in Tang’s schemes [29,30] , while E G 
represent the cost of an exponentiation on this multiplicative group G. λ represents the security parameter in [16] . RO is 
the abbreviation for the random oracle model. 
From the table, we see that our SEET scheme is the only one with IND-CCA/OW-CCA security for ciphertexts and IND- 
CCA security for token in the standard model. Compared to an IND-CCA secure variant of Slamanig et al.’s scheme [27] , the 
encryption and decryption procedures in SEET are much more eﬃcient since they only require 4 and 2 exponentiations in 
G 1 , respectively. Moreover, a ciphertext in our scheme consists of only 4 elements in G 1 , which is shorter than those in most 
existing schemes. 
5. Application in controlled set distance computation 
As our SEET construction enables controlled set operations/relations, it would also support many real-world applications 
that build upon set operations/relations. At the same time, the server is prevented from performing other computations. To 
exemplify such applications, we show in this section that our SEET scheme is applicable to controlled set distance com- 
putation, where three distance functions are considered. Suppose that two sets are encrypted by data owner (possibly at 
different times) under SEET and stored at a server. Subsequently, the data owner can authorize the server to compare the 
ciphertexts in these two sets. In this way, the server is able to compute the cardinalities of operation results of these datasets 
in ciphertext, e.g., intersection and union. 
5.1. Review of dissimilarity functions on sets 
Let A = { a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a m } and B = { b 1 , b 2 , · · · , b n } be two sets. The distance between A and B is determined by their simi- 
larity/dissimilarity score. Here, we review three similarity/dissimilarity functions between A and B , where the sets concerned 
may characterize the users’ proﬁle in implicit authentication [8] or interests/preferences in social networks and e-commerce 
systems [2] . These studies showed that the similarities/dissimilarities in all these cases are really determined by the cardi- 
nality of the intersection on sets A and B , or their variant sets. Since the datasets need to be encrypted to protect against 
the curious server, the server must be able to compute | A ∩ B | without knowing the real values of their entries. 
Case 1 : Both sets A and B contain independent nominal values, which are binary and the relationship between two val- 
ues is equality or nothing. The dissimilarity between A and B is inversely proportional to the cardinality of their intersection, 
that is: 
Dsm ( A , B ) = 
{
1 / | A ∩ B | if A ∩ B  = ∅ 
∞ otherwise (2) 
Case 2 : Both sets A and B comprise qualitative values, where the values may be correlated. Let  : E × E → Z + be the 
correlation function between the values in A and B , where E denotes their domain. Note that case 1 is a special case such 
that  (a i , b j ) = 1 if a i = b j , and 0 otherwise. Suppose both the server and data owner know the function  . The dissimilarity 
between A and B is deﬁned as follows: 
Dsm ( A , B ) = 
⎧ ⎪ ⎨ 
⎪ ⎩ 
1 / 
( ∑ 
a i ∈ A 
∑ 
b j ∈ B 
 (a i , b j ) 
) 
if 
∑ 
a i ∈ A 
∑ 
b j ∈ B 
 (a i , b j )  = 0 
∞ otherwise 
(3) 
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For every π ∈ E ,  π = 
∑ 
b j ∈ B  (π, b j ) reﬂects the overall similarity between π and B . Thus, Equality (3) equals to: 
Dsm ( A , B ) = 
⎧ ⎨ 
⎩ 
1 / 
∑ 
a i ∈ A 
 a i if 
∑ 
a i ∈ A 
 a i  = 0 
∞ otherwise 
(4) 
Case 3 : Both sets A and B comprise the same number of numerical feature values. Suppose | A | = | B | = m, the dissimi- 
larity between A and B is evaluated as follows: 
Dsm ( A , B ) = 
m ∑ 
i =1 
| a i − b i | (5) 
Deﬁning 
A ′ = { (i, j) : a i ∈ A , a i > 0 and 1 ≤ j ≤ a i } 
and 
B ′ = { (i, j) : b i ∈ B , b i > 0 and 1 ≤ j ≤ b i } , 
we have 
| A ′ ∩ B ′ | = |{ (i, j) : a i > 0 , b i > 0 and 1 ≤ j ≤ min { a i , b i }}| = 
m ∑ 
i =1 
min { a i , b i } 
It further implies: 
Dsm ( A , B ) = | A ′ | + | B ′ | − 2 | A ′ ∩ B ′ | (6) 
since 
| A ′ | + | B ′ | − 2 | A ′ ∩ B ′ | = 
m ∑ 
i =1 
( max { a i , b i } + min { a i , b i } ) − 2 
m ∑ 
i =1 
min { a i , b i } 
= 
m ∑ 
i =1 
( max { a i , b i } −min { a i , b i } ) = 
m ∑ 
i =1 
| a i − b i | 
In the remainder of this section, let  be a SEET scheme introduced in Section 3.3 . We present privacy-preserving 
schemes for controlled set distance computation based on . 
5.2. Privacy-preserving scheme for case 1 
Set-up : The system runs . Setup (λ) to produce pp  = ( ˆ  e, G 1 , G 2 , G T , g 1 , g 2 , p, H 1 , H 2 , H 3 , H 4 ) and chooses a crypto- 
graphic hash function H ′ : {0, 1} ∗ → G 1 . Thus, the public parameter is pp = pp  ∪ { H ′ } . With pp , the data owner invokes 
. KGen O ( pp ) to get a secret key sk O = (x, y, u, v ) , and the server runs . KGen T ( pp ) to obtain a pair of secret and public 
keys, that is, sk T = ( ˜  x, ˜  y, ˜  u, ˜  v) and pk T = ( ¯h 1 , ¯h 2 , ¯h 3 , ¯h 4 ) . 
Data processing : For every a i ∈ A , the data owner runs the encryption procedure 
C (a ) 
i = ( c i, 1 , c i, 2 , c i, 3 , c i, 4 ) ← . Enc ( sk O , pp , H ′ (a i )) . 
Similarly, every element b j ∈ B is encrypted as follows 
C (b) 
j = 
(
c j, 1 , c j, 2 , c j, 3 , c j, 4 
)
← . Enc ( sk O , pp , H ′ (b j )) . 
The data owner sends A = { C (a ) 
i : a i ∈ A } and B = { C (b) j : b j ∈ B } to the server. 
Authorization : The data owner runs etk ← . Aut ( sk O , pp , pk T ) and gives the encrypted token etk to the server. Then, 
the server is able to recover the token tk by running . Rec ( sk T , pp , etk ) . 
Distance computation : With the token tk , the server computes | A ∩ B | as follows: 
| A ∩ B | = ∣∣{ C (b) 
j : . Com ( pp , tk , C 
(a ) 
i , C 
(b) 
j ) = 1 for every C (a ) i ∈ A and C (b) j ∈ B } 
∣∣
By procedure . Com , for every b j ∈ B , if b j = a i for some a i ∈ A , then its ciphertext C (b) j must be counted in | A ∩ B | . Fi- 
nally, the server determines the distance (dissimilarity) between sets A and B according to Dsm ( A , B ) as deﬁned in Equality 
(2) using | A ∩ B | . 
Theorem 5.1. The above scheme from SEET for case 1 is correct. 
Proof. In the data processing procedure, the data owner provides her encrypted datasets A and B to the server, which 
cannot be decrypted by the server. In the authorization phase, the encrypted token etk is given to the server, which can 
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be correctly recovered as guaranteed by Theorem 3.1 . Also, following Theorem 3.1 for the soundness of SEET, with tk , the 
server is able to compare every pair of ciphertext in A and ciphertext in B to infer | A ∩ B | . Thus, correctness follows. 
Theorem 5.2. The above scheme from SEET for case 1 is secure against an honest-but-curious server. 
Proof. In the data processing phase, the server only gets the encrypted values in A and B , which security is guaranteed 
by Theorem 4.1 . With the token tk recovered from etk , the server runs the Com procedure in  to calculate Dsm (A , B ) . 
According to Theorem 4.2 , the procedure . Com does not leak the data owner’s real data values to the server, whether or 
not their ciphertexts are matched by . Com . 
Theorem 5.3. The authorization procedure in the above scheme from SEET for case 1 is secure against a malicious user on the 
communication channel. 
Proof. According to Theorem 4.3 , the encrypted token etk cannot be modiﬁed by anyone who intercepts the communication 
between the data owner and server, otherwise etk would not go through the recovery procedure under the server’s secret 
key. That also means such adversary cannot get the token tk . 
5.3. Privacy-preserving scheme for case 2 
Recall that for every π ∈ E ,  π = 
∑ 
b j ∈ B  (π, b j ) (see Section 5.1 ). Deﬁning 
˜ B = { π ∈ E :  π > 0 } , we have B ⊆ ˜ B since  ( π , 
π ) > 0 for every π ∈ E . The scheme for controlled set distance computation is designed as follows, where the data owner 
produces  π ciphertexts for every π ∈ ˜ B . 
Set-up : Same as in Section 5.2 . 
Data processing : Every a i ∈ A is encrypted in the same way as in Section 5.2 . For dataset B , the data owner con- 
structs ˜ B . For every π j ∈ ˜ B , the data owner runs the encryption procedure . Enc ( sk O , pp , π j ) for  π j times, and gets 
{ C (b) 
j,l = (c j,l, 1 , c j,l, 2 , c j,l, 3 , c j,l, 4 ) : 1 ≤ l ≤  π j } . Then, the data owner gives A = { C (a ) i : a i ∈ A } and B = { C (b) j,l : π j ∈ ˜ B , 1 ≤ l ≤  π } 
to the server. 
Authorization : Same as in Section 5.2 . 
Distance computation : With the token tk , the server computes: ∑ 
a i ∈ A 
 a i = 
∣∣{ C (b) 
j,l : . Com ( pp , tk , C 
(a ) 
i , C 
(b) 
j,l ) = 1 for every C 
(a ) 
i ∈ A and C (b) j,l ∈ B } 
∣∣
Note that for every π j ∈ ˜ B , if π j = a i for some a i ∈ A , then all of its  π j ciphertexts would be matched with C (a ) i by the 
procedure . Com . Finally, the server determines the distance (dissimilarity) between sets A and B according to Dsm ( A , B ) 
as deﬁned in Equality (4) . 
The correctness for the above scheme for case 2 is straightforward, and Theorem 5.3 is also achieved. Similar to 
Theorem 5.2 , we have the following corollary. 
Corollary 1. The above scheme from SEET for case 2 is secure against an honest-but-curious server. 
5.4. Privacy-preserving scheme for case 3 
As discussed in Section 5.1 , the distance computation is performed on sets A ′ = { (i, j) : a i ∈ A , a i > 0 and 1 ≤ j ≤ a i } and 
B ′ = { (i, j) : b i ∈ B , b i > 0 and 1 ≤ j ≤ b i } , rather than A and B directly. 
Set-up : Same as in Section 5.2 . 
Data processing : The data owner constructs A ′ and B ′ from A and B , respectively. Every pair (i, j) ∈ A ′ is encrypted as 
follows 
C (a ) 
i, j = 
(
c (a ) 
i, j, 1 , c 
(a ) 
i, j, 2 , c 
(a ) 
i, j, 3 , c 
(a ) 
i, j, 4 
)
← . Enc ( sk O , pp , H ′ (i ‖ j)) . 
Similarly, every (i, j) ∈ B ′ is encrypted as follows 
C (b) 
i, j = 
(
c (b) 
i, j, 1 , c 
(b) 
i, j, 2 , c 
(b) 
i, j, 3 , c 
(b) 
i, j, 4 
)
← . Enc ( sk O , pp , H ′ (i ‖ j)) . 
Then, the data owner gives A = { C (a ) 
i, j : (i, j) ∈ A 
′ } and B = { C (b) 
i, j : (i, j) ∈ B 
′ } to the server. 
Authorization : Same as in Section 5.2 . 
Distance computation : With the token tk , the server computes | A ′ ∩ B ′ | as follows: 
| A ′ ∩ B ′ | = ∣∣{ C (b) 
i, j : . Com ( pp , tk , C 
(a ) 
i, j , C 
(b) 
i, j ) = 1 for every C (a ) i, j ∈ A and C (b) i, j ∈ B } 
∣∣
Then, the server calculates Dsm ( A , B ) as deﬁned in Equality (5) . 
The correctness of the above scheme for case 3 is straightforward, and Theorem 5.3 is also achieved. Similar to 
Theorem 5.2 , we have the following corollary. 
Corollary 2. The above scheme from SEET for case 3 is secure against an honest-but-curious server. 
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Table 2 
Performance for controlled set distance computation for three cases. 
Section 5.2 Section 5.3 Section 5.4 
Data process Computation cost (4 m + 4 n ) E G 1 (4 m + 4 δ) E G 1 8 m ˆ aE G 1 
Storage cost (4 m + 4 n ) s G 1 (4 m + 4 δ) s G 1 8 m ˆ as G 1 
Authorization Computation cost (user) 7 E G 2 7 E G 2 7 E G 2 
Computation cost (server) 2 E G 2 2 E G 2 2 E G 2 
Communication cost 4 s G 2 4 s G 2 4 s G 2 
Distance computation Computation cost 2 ηE a ˆ e 2 mδE a ˆ e 2 η
′ E a ˆ e
5.5. Performance analysis 
In this section, we analyze our proposed schemes for controlled set distance computation in terms of computation, stor- 
age and communication costs. For computation cost, we only consider time-consuming operations such as exponentiations 
and bilinear pairings, whereas lightweight computations including additions, multiplications and hash evaluations are omit- 
ted. The analyzes are summarized in Table 2 for the three cases. In the table, the notations s G 1 , s G 2 , E G 1 , E G 2 , E a ˆ e have the 
same meanings as in Table 1 . 
We ﬁrst consider the scheme for case 1 (see Section 5.2 ). In the data processing phase, the user needs to encrypt a i ∈ A 
and b j ∈ B with the SEET scheme, which requires (4 m + 4 n ) exponentiations on G 1 . The server will store all ciphertexts in 
A and B which contain in total (4 m + 4 n ) group elements in G 1 . The authorization procedure allows the user to encrypt a 
token for the server to decrypt on group G 2 , which takes 7 and 2 exponentiations on G 2 , respectively. The encrypted token 
is 4 elements in G 2 , which is transmitted over the channel. (Note that the authorization procedure is the same for all three 
cases and will not be considered again in the following for the other two cases.) Suppose n ≤ m and let 
η =  m 
2 
 +  m − 1 
2 
 + · · · +  m − n + 1 
2 
 ≈ mn − (n 2 − n ) / 2 
In the distance computation phase, the server will compare η pairs of ciphertexts in A and B on average. 
Case 2 is similar to case 1, except that the user and server deal with a newly constructed set ˜ B rather than B . The 
computation and communication complexities for the worst case happen when ˜ B = E and the correlation function  takes 
the maximum value in its range L . Let δ = ∑ π j ∈ ˜ B  π j = n | E| L . Thus, the user and server will deal with (m + δ) values. For 
case 3, all computations are on sets A ′ and B ′ that are constructed from A and B , respectively, where | A | = | B | = m . Suppose 
all the a i and b j values take the maximum value ˆ a in domain E , which implies the worst case such that | A ′ | is maximum 
and | A ′ | = | B ′ | = m ˆ a. The other discussions are similar to case 1, except that the different sets A ′ and B ′ with m ˆ a elements 
are involved and 
η′ =  m ˆ a
2 
 +  m ˆ a − 1 
2 
 + · · · + 1 ≈ m 2 ˆ  a2 / 8 + m ˆ a/ 4 
5.6. Extension to implicit authentication 
Implicit authentication allows a server to authenticate a user based on his/her usage proﬁle [8,11,25] , which can be 
used to enhance existing knowledge-based authentication systems. In the initialization phase, the user deposits his/her 
proﬁle with the server, which enables the server to validate the user in the authentication phase based on the similar- 
ity/dissimilarity score between the stored proﬁle and the current one. Implicit authentication is different from two-factor 
authentication [20] in that the latter requires additional hardware in the system as second authentication factor, which 
would impose additional cost on users. 
Following Shahandashti and co-workers [8,25] , in an implicit authentication system, the server keeps a set of the user’s 
proﬁle features that consists of the history of the user’s action on the device, and frequently interacts with the user to do 
proﬁle update. The server is honest-but-curious and may be interested in the details of the user proﬁle. The device serves 
as a data source in the system, which always honestly collects the user’s proﬁle features. The server can perform implicit 
authentication on the user. In doing so, the user together with the device provide the latest proﬁle feature values to the 
server, so that the server is able to make an authentication decision by comparing with the stored user proﬁle. 
Domingo-Ferrer, Wu and Blanco-Justicia [8] presented privacy-preserving implicit authentication schemes for three types 
of user proﬁle. In fact, our three schemes in Sections 5.2 –5.4 for controlled set distance computation from SEET can be 
transformed into more eﬃcient symmetric solutions to the same problem in [8] . In our symmetric solutions, both phases 
of user proﬁle initialization and authentication apply the same encryption technique (i.e., SEET scheme). In the initialization 
phase, to enable the server to authenticate the user subsequently, the user also provides a token generated by the Aut 
procedure in SEET to the server. 
In the authentication phase, the token enables the server to compare the ciphertexts for the current proﬁle feature values 
with the stored feature values in encrypted format and calculate an authentication score. To protect against replay attacks, 
in each round of implicit authentication, the server needs to sign a time stamp and send it along with the signature to the 
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user. If the pair passes the veriﬁcation, then the device samples the current feature values, and the user encrypts them, 
signs the string ciphertexts ‖ timestamp , and gives the ciphertexts together with the signature to the server for veriﬁcation 
and computing an authentication score. Note that in the authentication phase, the server does not give any information 
on the stored proﬁle to the user, which avoids leaking information on the stored proﬁle to a malicious user. Since each 
feature value is separately encrypted, our implicit authentication solutions support eﬃcient proﬁle update without involving 
all feature values. The transformed solutions are straightforward, thus we do not go into details here. 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper, we studied the problem of controlled operations on sets that are hosted by a curious server. The server can 
operate on encrypted sets only upon getting an authorization from the data owner, and the authorization is controlled in the 
sense that only the designated server can recover a token to perform computations without decrypting data sets. To address 
the problem, we introduced the notion of secure encryption with authorized equality test (SEET) and formalized its security 
model to capture two phases of data conﬁdentiality along with token privacy. We proposed a SEET construction from Type 
3 bilinear pairing, and formally proved its security against three types of adversary without using random oracles as deﬁned 
in our security model. An eﬃciency analysis demonstrated that our SEET construction outperforms existing (public/private 
key and identity-based) encryption schemes that support equality test on ciphertexts. As exemplary applications of SEET, 
we also developed eﬃcient approaches for controlled set distance computation, and further discussed their application in 
implicit authentication system. 
Acknowledgment 
This article is based on research work supported by the Singapore National Research Foundation under NCR Award Num- 
ber NRF2014NCR-NCR001-012 . 
References 
[1] A. Abadi, S. Terzis, C. Dong, O-PSI: delegated private set intersection on outsourced datasets, in: H. Federrath, D. Gollmann (Eds.), ICT Systems Security 
and Privacy Protection: 30th IFIP TC 11 International Conference, SEC 2015, Hamburg, Germany, May 26–28, 2015, Proceedings, Springer International 
Publishing, Cham, 2015, pp. 3–17, doi: 10.1007/978- 3- 319- 18467- 8 _ 1 . 
[2] A. Blanco, J. Domingo-Ferrer, O. Farràs, D. Sánchez, Distance computation between two private preference functions, in: N. Cuppens-Boulahia, F. Cup- 
pens, S. Jajodia, A. Abou El Kalam, T. Sans (Eds.), ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection: 29th IFIP TC 11 International Conference, SEC 2014, 
Marrakech, Morocco, June 2–4, 2014. Proceedings, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2014, pp. 460–470, doi: 10.1007/978- 3- 642- 55415- 5 _ 39 . 
[3] D. Boneh, X. Boyen, Eﬃcient selective-ID secure identity-based encryption without random oracles, in: C. Cachin, J.L. Camenisch (Eds.), Advances in 
Cryptology – EUROCRYPT 2004: International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Interlaken, Switzerland, May 
2–6, 2004. Proceedings, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2004, pp. 223–238, doi: 10.1007/978- 3- 540- 24676- 3 _ 14 . 
[4] D. Boneh, E. Shen, B. Waters, Strongly unforgeable signatures based on computational Diﬃe–Hellman, in: M. Yung, Y. Dodis, A. Kiayias, T. Malkin 
(Eds.), Public Key Cryptography – PKC 2006: 9th International Conference on Theory and Practice in Public-Key Cryptography, New York, NY, USA, 
April 24–26, 2006. Proceedings, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006, pp. 229–240, doi: 10.1007/11745853 _ 15 . 
[5] S. Chatterjee, A. Menezes, On cryptographic protocols employing asymmetric pairings—the role of ψ revisited, Discrete Appl. Math. 159 (13) (2011) 
1311–1322. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2011.04.021 . 
[6] R. Cramer, V. Shoup, Design and analysis of practical public-key encryption schemes secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attack, SIAM J. Comput. 
33 (1) (2003) 167–226, doi: 10.1137/S0097539702403773 . 
[7] C. Delerablée, D. Pointcheval, Dynamic fully anonymous short group signatures, in: P.Q. Nguyen (Ed.), Progress in Cryptology – VIETCRYPT 2006: First 
International Conference on Cryptology in Vietnam, Hanoi, Vietnam, September 25–28, 2006., Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2006, 
pp. 193–210, doi: 10.1007/11958239 _ 13 . 
[8] J. Domingo-Ferrer , Q. Wu , A. Blanco-Justicia , Flexible and robust privacy-preserving implicit authentication, in: H. Federrath, D. Gollmann (Eds.), ICT 
Systems Security and Privacy Protection: 30th IFIP TC 11 International Conference, SEC 2015, Hamburg, Germany, May 26–28, 2015, Proceedings, 
Springer International Publishing, Cham, 2015, pp. 18–34 . 
[9] T. Elgamal, A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory 31 (4) (1985) 469–472, doi: 10. 
1109/TIT.1985.1057074 . 
[10] K. Huang , R. Tso , Y.-C. Chen , S.M.M. Rahman , A. Almogren , A. Alamri , PKE-AET: public key encryption with authorized equality test, Comput. J. 58 (10) 
(2015) 2686–2697 . 
[11] M. Jakobsson , E. Shi , P. Golle , R. Chow , Implicit authentication for mobile devices, in: Proceedings of the 4th USENIX Conference on Hot Topics in 
Security, in: HotSec’09, USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, USA, 2009 . 
[12] F. Kerschbaum , Collusion-resistant outsourcing of private set intersection, in: Proceedings of the 27th Annual ACM Symposium on Applied Computing, 
in: SAC’12, ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2012, pp. 1451–1456 . 
[13] F. Kerschbaum , Outsourced private set intersection using homomorphic encryption, in: Proceedings of the 7th ACM Symposium on Information, Com- 
puter and Communications Security, in: ASIACCS’12, ACM, New York, NY, USA, 2012, pp. 85–86 . 
[14] H.T. Lee, S. Ling, J.H. Seo, H. Wang, CCA2 Attack and modiﬁcation of Huang et al.’s public key encryption with authorized equality test, Comput. J. 59 
(11) (2016) 1689–1694, doi: 10.1093/comjnl/bxw033 . 
[15] H.T. Lee, S. Ling, J.H. Seo, H. Wang, Semi-generic construction of public key encryption and identity-based encryption with equality test, Inf. Sci. 373 
(2016) 419–440. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2016.09.013 . 
[16] H.T. Lee , S. Ling , J.H. Seo , H. Wang , T.-Y. Youn , Public key encryption with equality test in the standard model, 2016 . 
[17] S. Ma, Identity-based encryption with outsourced equality test in cloud computing, Inf. Sci. 328 (2016) 389–402. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.2015. 
08.053 . 
[18] S. Ma , Q. Huang , M. Zhang , B. Yang , Eﬃcient public key encryption with equality test supporting ﬂexible authorization, IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 
10 (3) (2015) 458–470 . 
[19] S. Ma , M. Zhang , Q. Huang , B. Yang , Public key encryption with delegated equality test in a multi-user setting, Comput. J. 58 (4) (2015) 986–1002 . 
[20] C. Mann, D. Loebenberger, Two-factor authentication for the bitcoin protocol, Int. J. Inf. Secur. 16 (2) (2017) 213–226, doi: 10.1007/s10207- 016- 0325- 1 . 
[21] M. Naor, M. Yung, Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks, in: Proceedings of the Twenty-second Annual ACM 
Symposium on Theory of Computing, in: STOC’90, ACM, New York, NY, USA, 1990, pp. 427–437, doi: 10.1145/100216.100273 . 
Y. Wang et al. / Information Sciences 414 (2017) 289–305 305 
[22] L. Nguyen, R. Safavi-Naini, Eﬃcient and provably secure trapdoor-free group signature schemes from bilinear pairings, in: P.J. Lee (Ed.), Advances in 
Cryptology – ASIACRYPT 2004: 10th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security, Jeju Island, Korea, 
December 5–9, 2004. Proceedings, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2004, pp. 372–386, doi: 10.1007/978- 3- 540- 30539- 2 _ 26 . 
[23] H. Pang, X. Ding, Privacy-preserving ad-hoc equi-join on outsourced data, ACM Trans. Database Syst. 39 (3) (2014) 23:1–23:40, doi: 10.1145/2629501 . 
[24] M.R. Reyhanitabar, W. Susilo, Y. Mu, Enhanced target collision resistant hash functions revisited, in: O. Dunkelman (Ed.), Fast Software Encryption: 
16th International Workshop, FSE 2009 Leuven, Belgium, February 22–25, 2009, Springer Berlin Heidelberg, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2009, pp. 327–344, 
doi: 10.1007/978- 3- 642- 03317- 9 _ 20 . 
[25] S.F. Shahandashti , R. Safavi-Naini , N.A. Safa , Reconciling user privacy and implicit authentication for mobile devices, Comput. Secur. 53 (C) (2015) 
215–233 . 
[26] V. Shoup , Sequences of games: a tool for taming complexity in security proofs, 2004 . (IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive). 
[27] D. Slamanig, R. Spreitzer, T. Unterluggauer, Adding controllable linkability to pairing-based group signatures for free, in: S.S.M. Chow, J. Camenisch, 
L.C.K. Hui, S.M. Yiu (Eds.), Information Security: 17th International Conference, ISC 2014, Hong Kong, China, October 12–14, 2014. Proceedings, Springer 
International Publishing, Cham, 2014, pp. 388–400, doi: 10.1007/978- 3- 319- 13257- 0 _ 23 . 
[28] C.H. Tan, Secure public-key encryption scheme without random oracles, Inf. Sci. 178 (17) (2008) 3435–3442. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ins.20 08.04.0 06 . 
[29] Q. Tang , Towards public key encryption scheme supporting equality test with ﬁne-grained authorization, in: U. Parampalli, P. Hawkes (Eds.), Proceed- 
ings of Information Security and Privacy: 16th Australasian Conference, ACISP 2011, LNCS, 6812, Springer, Heidelberg, 2011, pp. 389–406 . 
[30] Q. Tang , Public key encryption supporting plaintext equality test and user-speciﬁed authorization, Secur. Commun. Netw. 5 (12) (2012) 1351–1362 . 
[31] Y. Wang, H. Pang, Probabilistic public key encryption for controlled equijoin in relational databases, Comput. J. 60 (4) (2017) 600–612, doi: 10.1093/ 
comjnl/bxw083 . 
[32] G. Yang, C.H. Tan, Q. Huang, D.S. Wong, Probabilistic public key encryption with equality test, in: J. Pieprzyk (Ed.), Topics in Cryptology - CT-RSA 2010, 
LNCS, 5985, Springer, Heidelberg, 2010, pp. 119–131, doi: 10.1007/978- 3- 642- 11925- 5 _ 9 . 
